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Note: Disclosure of Union Authorization Cards Under
the Freedom of Information Act-Interpreting the
Personal Privacy Exemptions
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)l was enacted by Con-
gress in 1966 "to establish a general philosophy of full agency disclo-
sure.1 2 The Act creates a general right of access to federal agency
records,3 subject only to nine specific exemptions.' Much of the litiga-
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976). See generally SUaCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATiv PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION ACT SOURCEOOK: LEGISLATIvE MATERLALS, CASES, ARTicLEs (Comm.
Print 1974); see also HOUSE CoMMi. ON GoVERNMENT OPERATIONS & SENATE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., 1ST SEas., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND AMENDMENTS
OF 1974 SOURCEBOOK: LEGISLATIVEHISTORY, TEXTS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS (Joint Comm.
Print 1975).
2. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965) [hereinafter cited as SENATE
REPORT].
3. [E]ach agency, upon any request for records which (A) reasonably
describes such records and (B) is made in accordance with published rules
stating the time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to be followed, shall
make the records promptly available to any person.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1976).
4. The rule of disclosure does not apply to records that are
(1) . . .specifically authorized under criteria established by an Execu-
tive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign
policy... ;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than [the
Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1976)]), provided that
such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in
such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes
particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to
be withheld;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained
from a person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would
not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with
the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but
only to the extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere
with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial
or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in
the case of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the
course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful na-
tional security intelligence investigation, confidential information furnished
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tion concerning the scope of these exemptions has involved the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (Board), which has long sought to pro-
tect the confidentiality of the records it uses as a basis for union
representation elections and unfair labor practice proceedings.5
The FOIA exemptions most frequently invoked by the Board
have been exemption 6, which applies to "personnel and medical files
and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,"I and exemption 7, which
applies to "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement pur-
poses, but only to the extent that the production of such records
would . . .interfere with enforcement proceedings . . .[or] consti-
tute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 7 Courts have gen-
erally preserved the confidentiality of witness affidavits and Board
agents' reports under exemption 7 by adopting a broad interpretation
of "law enforcement purposes" and by finding that disclosure of such
records would interfere with these purposes.8 Courts are divided, how-
ever, on whether either exemption 6 or exemption 7 justifies the
only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and
procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement
personnel;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition re-
ports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for
the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps,
concerning wells.
Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person
requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under
this subsection.
Id. § 552(b).
5. See generally PROJECT ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OF THE
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, LITIGATION UNDER THE AMENDED
FEDERAL FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 73 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as ACLU
PROJECT]; Connolly & Fox, Employer Rights and Access to Documents Under the
Freedom of Information Act, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 203, 230-37 (1977); Weigman,
Administrative Law: The Scope of the FOIA Exemptions, 1977 ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 1;
Note, The Right to Disclosure of NLRB Documents Under the Freedom of Information
Act, 5 FORDHAM URa. L.J. 119 (1976); Note, Backdooring the NLRB: Use and Abuse
of the Amended FOIA for Administrative Discovery, 8 Loy. CI. L.J. 145 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Backdooring the NLRB]; Note, The Impact of the FOIA on
NLRB Discovery Procedures, 10 MICH. J.L. REF. 476 (1977); 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
114 (1976).
6. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1976).
7. Id. § 552(b)(7)(A), (C). Exemption 5, id. § 552(b)(5), which deals with inter-
agency and intra-agency memoranda, has also been invoked by the Board, see NLRB
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975), but the exemption has no application
to authorization cards.
8. See, e.g., Roger J. Au & Son, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1976);
Wellman Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1974). See generally notes 37-
39, 102-03 infra and accompanying text.
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Board's refusal to reveal union authorization cards.' This divergence
of views is based on a more fundamental disagreement about how
broadly the exemptions of the FOIA should be construed in order
to accommodate the policy of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA),0 which protects employees' freedom of association and or-
ganization."
This Note analyzes the issues raised by the authorization card
cases. After outlining the policies and procedures of the NLRA and
the FOIA, the Note examines judicial constructions of exemptions 6
and 7 and argues that disclosure of authorization cards would infringe
both the statutory and constitutional rights of employees under the
NLRA. Finally, the Note discusses the problems inherent in attempt-
ing to use a broad interpretation of the exemptions and proposes an
alternative method for protecting the rights of employees without
sacrificing the general policy of the FOIA in favor of full agency
disclosure.
I. THE PROBLEM
The NLRA was enacted to reduce industrial strife by encourag-
ing collective bargaining and "by protecting the exercise by workers
of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing."" To help achieve this goal,
the NLRA empowers and requires the Board to certify the employees'
choice of bargaining representatives and to promulgate election rules
to guarantee the freedom of such a choice."3 An important goal in the
development of these election rules has been to ensure that election
campaigns are held in "laboratory conditions,"' 4 free of undue influ-
ence by either the union or the employer. Speedy elections and a
policy of confidentiality for records revealing the union sentiments of
employees are among the methods by which the Board has sought to
achieve these conditions."
9. See notes 40-48 infra and accompanying text. A survey of several of these
decisions is found in Weigman, supra note 5, at 21.
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-168 (1970).
11, See id. § 157.
12. Id. § 151.
13. See id. §§ 151, 156, 159.
14. An election can serve its true purpose only if the surrounding condi-
tions enable employees to register a free and untrammelled choice for or
against a bargaining representative. ...
.. In election proceedings, it is the Board's function to provide a
laboratory . . . as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited
desires of the employees.
General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 126-27 (1948).
15. These two methods are designed to neutralize the influential leverage of
1978]
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Required by statute to conduct a secret ballot election when it
appears that a substantial number of employees in a given bargaining
unit wish to be represented by a union, 6 the Board has promulgated
a rule that a group petitioning for a representation election must
present evidence that thirty percent of the workers in the bargaining
unit desire representation by a particular union.7 This evidence
usually takes the form of union authorization cards,'8 which employ-
employers that inheres in the employee-employer relationship. See Intertype Co. v.
NLRB, 401 F.2d 41, 44, 45 (4th Cir. 1968); cf. 29 U.S.C. § 657(f)(1) (1970) (employees
reporting OSHA violations may request that their names not be released to their
employers).'Limited discovery rules serve a similar goal in unfair labor practice pro-
ceedings. See Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484, 487 n.7, 491 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976).
16. Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such
regulations as may be prescribed by the Board-
(A) by an employee or group- of employees or any individual or
labor organization acting in their behalf alleging that a substantial
number of employees (i) wish to be represented for collective bargain-
ing and that their employer declines to recognize their representative
as the representative defined in subsection (a) of this section, or (ii)
assert that the individual or labor organization, which has been certi-
fied or is being currently recognized by their employer as the bargain-
ing representative, is no longer a representative as defined in subsec-
tion (a) of this section; or
(B) by an employer, alleging that one or more individuals or
labor organizations have presented to him a claim to be recognized as
the representative defined in subsection (a) of this section;
the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to
believe that a question of representation affecting commerce exists shall
provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice. Such hearing may be
conducted by an officer or employee of the regional office, who shall not make
any recommendations with respect thereto. If the Board finds upon the re-
cord of such hearing that such a question of representation exists, it shall
direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof.
29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1970).
17. See 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (1977). After an election petition is filed, a Board
agent investigates its validity and the appropriateness of the proposed bargaining unit.
If the parties cannot agree on election terms, an administrative hearing is held to
determine the adequacy of the showing of interest and the appropriateness of the
bargaining unit. If the hearing examiner determines that "a question . . . of represen-
tation affecting commerce exists," 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1970), he then directs that
an election be held, usually within thirty days of his decision. See 29 C.F.R. § 101.21(d)
(1977).
The requirement of a thirty percent showing of interest, along with the require-
ment of a petition and representation hearing, was developed as an administrative
guideline during the early 1940's and officially announced by the Board in 1945. See
Brad Foote Gear Works, Inc., 60 N.L.R.B. 97, 99 n.4 (1945); 10 NLRB ANN. REP. 16
n.7 (1945).
18. The Board has also accepted, as suitable evidence of support, signatures on
a petition, signed union application cards, and cards expressing a desire for an election
and for certification of the petitioning union. See NLRB v. Somerset Shoe Co., 111
F.2d 681 (1st Cir. 1940); Potomac Elec. Power Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 553 (1955).
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ees sign to authorize a union to represent them for all purposes of
collective bargaining."
Other than cases arising under the FOIA, demands for access to
authorization cards have been rare, and the Board has effectively
preserved the confidentiality of these cards through a policy that
precludes any legal challenge to their validity.2" Such challenges are
disallowed because they would delay the election process21 and be-
cause the Board-administered election is regarded as a more reliable
measure of union support than the showing of interest, which is only
an administrative yardstick to determine whether an election is
worthwhile.2
Prior to the enactment of the FOIA, the nearest approximation
of a direct request to see authorization cards occurred in 1941 in a
case where the employer disputed a Board order to bargain based on
a showing of majority support for the union.Y The employer's claim
that he was entitled to access to the cards in order to determine their
validity was rejected on the ground that disclosure would "deprive
the employees of their secrecy of choice which the Act is designed to
secure."'" This language suggests that the confidentiality of union
authorization cards is protected not only as a part of the Board's
efforts to preserve laboratory conditions during an election campaign,
19. On a typical union authorization card the employee states that "I, the under-
signed employee of [name of company] hereby authorize the [name of union] to
represent me for all purposes of collective bargaining in respect to wages, hours and
other conditions of employment in accordance with the provisions of the National
Labor Relations Act." Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214, 217 n.2
(3d Cir. 1977). The card also contains space for the employee's name, address, and
signature. See id. See also Silver Fleet, Inc., 174 N.L.R.B. 873, 875 n.8 (1969) (concur-
ring opinion) (proposal for a model authorization card).
20. See NLRB v. P.A.F. Equipment Co., 528 F,2d 286 (10th Cir. 1976); Intertype
Co. v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 41 (4th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Air Control Prods., 335 F.2d 245
(5th Cir. 1964); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. NLRB, 209 F.2d 782 (7th Cir. 1953); NLRB
v. J.I. Case Co., 201 F.2d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 1953) ("Among other undesirable conse-
quences, a trial of [the sufficiency of a union's showing of interest] would bring about
disclosure of the individual employees' desires with respect to representation and
would violate the long-established policy of secrecy of the employees' choice in such
matters.").
21. "Since time is often a critical factor in election cases, .... it is essential that
representation petitions be processed expeditiously with a view to holding the election
as soon after the filing of the petition as is reasonably possible." Intertype Co. v.
NLRB, 401 F.2d 41, 44 (4th Cir. 1968) (citation omitted) (holding that employer could
not challenge validity of authorization cards).
22. See NLRB v. J.I Case Co., 201 F.2d 597, 600 (9th Cir..1953). See generally
NLRB v. P.A.F. Equipment Co., 528 F.2d 286 (10th Cir. 1976); Intertype Co. v. NLRB,
401 F.2d 41 (4th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Air Control Prods., 335 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1964);
Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. NLRB, 209 F.2d 782 (7th Cir. 1953).
23. See NLRB v. New Era Die Co., 118 F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1941).
24. Id. at 504. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1970) (requiring that the
Board "direct an election by secret ballot").
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:949
but also as a part of the statutory requirement that elections be
conducted by secret ballot. 5
While the NLRA thus seeks to preserve the confidentiality of
union authorization cards, the FOIA mandates disclosure of all fed-
eral agency records to "any person"2 who requests to see them, unless
the records are explicitly exempted by the statute." Any final agency
refusal to disclose information is immediately reviewable by a federal
district court.28
In drafting and subsequently amending the nine statutory ex-
emptions to the FOIA, Congress has sought to strike a balance be-
tween freedom of information and other important interests.29 Con-
gress was particularly concerned that a policy of full disclosure of
governmental records would lead to improper invasions of privacy.2
Rather than enacting a general exemption to protect personal privacy
interests, however, Congress chose to limit such protection to two
specific contexts." Under exemption 6 the agency may refuse to dis-
25. See notes 142-45 infra and accompanying text.
26. "[E]ach agency, upon any request for records . . . shall make the records
promptly available to any person." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1976).
27. Id. In reference to the exemptions, the FOIA states that "[t]his section does
not authorize withholding of information or limit the availability of records to the
public, except as specifically stated in this section. This section is not authority to
withhold information from Congress." Id. § 552(c).
Prior to the enactment of the FOIA, disclosure of information was governed by the
Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (current version at 5
U.S.C. § 552 (1976)). The Senate Report on the FOIA characterized this section as a
"withholding statute, not [a] disclosure statute." SENATE REPoRT, supra note 2, at 5.
The pre-FOIA Administrative Procedure Act allowed information to be withheld "for
good cause" or when secrecy was "in the public interest," or when the person request-
ing the information was not "properly or directly concerned." Administrative ProCe-
dure Act, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976)).
Final decisions on disclosure lay with governmental officials alone without effective
judicial review "of denied requests.
28. On complaint, the district court of the United States . . . has
jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to
order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the
complainant. In such a case the court shall determine the matter de novo,
and may examine the contents of such agency records in camera to deter-
mine whether such records or any part thereof shall be withheld under any
of the exemptions set forth in subsection (b) of this section, and the burden
is on the agency to sustain its action.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976).
29. See SENATE REPoirr, supra note 2, at 3, 5, 7.
30. See generally Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens,
73 MICH. L. REv. 971 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Michigan Project].
31. For discussion of the cases interpreting the protection of privacy under the
FOIA, especially under exemption 6, see ACLU PRoJEcT, supra note 5, at 44-52, 75;
Michigan Project, supra note 30, at 1078-85; Note, The Freedom of Information Act:
A Seven Year Assessment, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 895, 953-56 (1974); Comment, The
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close "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of
which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy,"" and under exemption 7(C) "investigatory records com-
piled for law enforcement purposes" may be preserved from public
scrutiny, "but only to the extent that the production of such records
would . . . constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal pri-
vacy."
In the balancing between disclosure and privacy, the legislative
reports make clear that the interest in disclosure is at least as great
as the interest in privacy." Furthermore, the FOIA explicitly pre-
cludes consideration of privacy interests other than those specifically
enumerated in the exemptions," and the Supreme Court has read
this limitation as indicating that the exemptions themselves are to
be construed narrowly.36
Until recently, conflicts between the FOIA and the NLRA gener-
ally arose when a party requested to see the affidavit of a witness in
an unfair labor practice proceeding.3 Suits were brought under the
Freedom of Information Act's Privacy Exemption and the Privacy Act of 1974, 11
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 596 (1976).
32. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1976).
33. Id. § 552(b)(7)(C).
34. H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966), reprinted in [1966] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2418, 2423 [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT]:
It is vital to our way of life to reach a workable balance between the right
of the public to know and the need of the Government to keep information
in confidence to the extent necessary without permitting indiscriminate se-
crecy. The right of the individual to be able to find out how his Government
is operating can be just as important to him as his right to confide in his
Government. This bill strikes a balance in considering all these interests.
The Senate Report describes this balance as "a workable formula which encom-
passes, balances, and protects all interests, yet places emphasis on the fullest responsi-
ble disclosure." SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 3. This emphasis is reflected in the
"clearly unwarranted" and "unwarranted" invasion of privacy language of exemptions
6 and 7.
35. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1976) (withholding of information is not authorized
"except as specifically stated" in the exemptions).
36. "These exemptions are explicitly made exclusive," EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S.
73, 79 (1973), and must be construed narrowly, Department of the Air Force v. Rose,
425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976). See also Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 US. 977 (1974); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
37. Unfair labor practice proceedings must be initiated by the filing of a charge
with the Board by an aggrieved person, employer, or qualified labor organization
within six months of the alleged unfair labor practice. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970).
The charging party usually submits supporting evidence in the form of affidavits and
lists of witnesses. The Board then makes an investigation of the charges. If the charges
are substantiated and a settlement is not reached, the Regional Director will issue a
complaint and a hearing will be held before an administrative law judge, who prepares
a decision containing proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposi-
tion of the case to the Board. For cases and commentary concerning requests for
affidavits gathered during Board investigation, see note 5 supra.
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FOIA in order to circumvent the limited discovery privileges allowed
under Board regulations." Since formal proceedings were underway
in these cases, most of the decisions turned on the question whether
disclosure would, in terms of exemption 7(A), "interfere with law
enforcement proceedings."3 Given the applicability of exemption
7(A), the courts did not have to determine whether disclosure would
constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy under exemption 6 or
7(C).
Since 1976, however, there have been several cases to which ex-
emption 7(A) has not applied."0 In each case, the regional office of the
38. The Board does not allow the discovery of witness statements in the posses-
sion of the Board until the witness has testified. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 102, 118(b)(1) (1977).
Courts have criticized this narrow discovery policy as promoting "trial by ambush."
See NLRB v. Hardeman Garment Corp., 557 F.2d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 1977); New
England Medical Center Hosp. v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 377, 387 (1st Cir. 1977). Recently,
the Chairman's Task Force on the NLRB has recommended the establishment of more
extensive discovery procedures. See CuRmAN's TASK FORE ON THE NLRB, 1976 IN-
TERIM REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, reprinted in 93 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 221, 247
(1976).
39. Exemption 7(A) excludes from disclosure under the FOIA any "investigatory
records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the pro-
duction of such records would ... interfere with law enforcement proceedings." 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (1976). The Supreme Court has concluded that exemption 7(A)
was not intended "to prevent the federal courts from determining that, with respect
to particular kinds of enforcement proceedings, disclosure of particular kinds of inves-
tigatory records while a case is pending would generally 'interfere with enforcement
proceedings.'" NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 98 S. Ct. 2311, 2324 (1978).
Applying this conclusion to the facts presented, the Court in Robbins Tire held "that
witness statements in pending unfair labor practice proceedings are exempt from FOIA
disclosure at least until the completion of the Board's hearing." Id. In its opinion, the
Court noted that the weight of authority in the circuit courts of appeals had followed
the Second Circuit's lead in Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976), which had also held witness affidavis exempt from disclo-
sure under exemption 7(A). See 98 S. Ct. at 2315. See generally NLRB v. Hardeman
Garment Corp., 557 F.2d 559 (6th Cir. 1977); Bellingham Frozen Foods v. Henderson,
No. 76-1684 (9th Cir. May 3, 1977), rev'g 91 L.R.R.M. 2761 (W.D. Wash. 1976);
Harvey's Wagon Wheel, Inc. v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1976); New England
Medical Center Hosp. v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 377 (1st Cir. 1976); Cessna Aircraft Co. v.
NLRB, 542 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1976); Maremount Corp. v. NLRB, 93 L.R.R.M. 2799
(10th Cir. 1976); Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB, 539 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1976);
Roger J. Au & Son, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1976); Goodfriend W. Corp. v.
Fuchs, 535 F.2d 145 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 895 (1976); Kent Corp. v. NLRB,
530 F.2d 612 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976).
40. In these cases, no unfair labor practice complaint had been issued against
the party seeking disclosure, so that the courts could not rely on exemption 7(A). See
Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1977), rev'g 414 F.
Supp. 426 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Madeira Nursing Center v. NLRB, 96 L.R.R.M. 2411 (S.D.
Ohio 1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-3370 (6th Cir. July 19, 1977); Howard Johnson
Co. v. NLRB (Region 3), 96 L.R.R.M. 2214 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); Pacific Molasses Co. v.
NLRB, 95 L.R.R.M. 2638 (E.D. La. 1977), rev'd, 577 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1978); Howard
Johnson Co. v. NLRB (Region 7), 444 F. Supp. 843 (E.D. Mich. 1977), appeal
docketed, No. 77-1763 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 1977).
[Vol. 62:949
PRIVACY EXEMPTIONS
Board was presented with petitions for an election supported by
union authorization cards that substantiated an adequate showing of
interest. The plaintiff-employers, seeking to challenge the adequacy
of the showing prior to the representation hearing, requested to see
the cards. When the Board refused," the employers brought suits
under the FOIA to compel disclosure.42
In deciding these authorization card cases the courts have been
far from unanimous in either result or rationale. Four federal district
courts have ordered disclosure of the cards upon finding that none
of the FOIA exemptions was applicable.43 Reviewing one such deci-
sion, the Third Circuit first agreed that exemption 7 did not apply,
but then reversed the district court on the ground that the cards were
protected from disclosure by exemption 6.11 In reversing another such
district court decision, the Fifth Circuit has recently followed the
reasoning of the Third Circuit as to exemption 6 without reaching the
question of the applicability of exemption 7.45 Two federal district
courts have held the cards exempt under both exemptions 6 and 7,11
while another court has applied exemption 6 without rejecting the
possible application of exemption 7.47 Finally, one federal district
41. Courts presumably would not order that the actual cards be handed over, but
rather that a photostatic copy of them or a list of those signing the cards be disclosed.
This distinction may be important in light of the Third Circuit's statement that the
photostatic copies of the cards are the "agency record," not the cards themselves since
"there is a plausible argument that the cards are union property, merely in the tempo-
rary possession of the NLRB." Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214,
218 n.4 (3d Cir. 1977).
42. In four other authorization card cases, plaintiffs were involved in unfair labor
practice proceedings at the time the FOIA suits were brought. See L'eggs Prods., Inc.
v. NLRB, 93 L.R.R.M. 2488 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (cards exempt under exemptions 6 and
7(C)); Donn Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 93 L.R.R.M. 2065 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (cards not
exeiimpt under either exemption 6 or 7); Gerico, Inc. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2713 (D.
Colo. 1976) (cards exempt under exemption 7(A) during pendency of proceedings, but
after proceeding may be released along with other records); NLRB v. Biophysics Sys.,
Inc., 91 L.R.R.M. 3079 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (cards exempt under 7(C)).
43. See Pacific Molasses Co. v. NLRB, 95 L.R.R.M. 2638 (E.D. La. 1977), rev'd,
577 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1978); Howard Johnson Co. v. NLRB (Region 7), 444 F. Supp.
845 (W.D. Mich. 1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-1763 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 1977); Donn
Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 93 L.R.R.M. 2065 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Committee on Masonic
Homes v. NLRB, 414 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Pa. 1976), rev'd, 556 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1977).
44. See Comiittee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214, 218-19, 221 (3d
Cir. 1977), rev'g 414 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
45. See Pacific Molasses Co. v. NLRB, 577 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'g 95
L.R.R.M. 2638 (E.D. La. 1977).
46. See Howard Johnson Co. v. NLRB (Region 3), 96 L.R.R.M. 2214 (W.D.N.Y.
1977); L'eggs Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 93 L.R.R.M. 2488 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
47. See Madeira Nursing Center v. NLRB, 96 L.R.R.M. 2411 (S.D. Ohio 1977),
appeal docketed, No. 77-3370 (6th Cir. July 19, 1977).
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court has relied exclusively on exemption 7 in refusing to order disclo-
sure.4"
To understand this disagreement among the courts, it is neces-
sary to examine the two general questions of interpretation that the
decisions have considered. Because Congress decided to limit consid-
eration of privacy interests to specific types of materials, a considera-
tion of an employer's claim to access involves two steps.49 The first
question is whether the cards are "similar" to the personnel and
medical files covered by exemption 6,50 or are "investigatory records
compiled for law enforcement purposes" under exemption 7.51 The
second question, under either exemption, is whether the disclosure of
the cards would constitute an "unwarranted invasion of personal pri-
vacy. "52
II. THRESHOLD REQUIREMENTS
A. EXEMPTION 6: "PRSONNE AND MEDICAL FILES AND SIMILAR FILES"
In attempting to determine the applicability of exemption 6 to
union authorization cards, the threshold question is whether such
cards are sufficiently similar to medical and personnel files for them
to fall within the exemption. 3 The legislative reports mention the
files maintained by the Veteran's Administration, the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, the Selective Service, and the Bu-
reau of Prisons as the types of files covered by the exemption, 4 al-
48. See NLRB v. Biophysics Sys., Inc., 91 L.R.R.M. 3079 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
49. Although this two-step inquiry, first into threshold requirements and then
into the invasion of privacy issue, is not as clearly delineated in exemption 6 as in
exemption 7, one must recall that the current exemption 7 is the product of a 1974
amendment to the FOIA and reflects the lessons learned from eight years of experience
with the Act. Infrequently litigated, exemption 6 has not been altered or clarified by
Congress since its enactment. Nevertheless, in the only Supreme Court test of exemp-
tion 6, the Court held that it does not establish a blanket exemption for all personnel
and medical files. See Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976). The Court
insisted that disclosure of a file, whether medical, personnel, or similar, must consti-
tute an unwarranted invasion of privacy to be exempt. See id. at 371.
50. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1976).
51. Id. § 552(b)(7).
52. Id. § 552(b)(6). Exemption 6 requires that the invasion of privacy be
"clearly unwarranted." Id. (emphasis added); see note 114 infra.
53. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1976). For discussions of the meaning of "similar
files," see Belair, Agency Implementation of the Privacy Act and the FOIA, Impact of
the Government's Collection, Maintenance and Dissemination of Personally Identifia-
ble Information, 10 J. MAR. J. PRAc. & Poc. 465, 468 (1977); Michigan Project, supra
note 30, at 1078-85; Note, supra note 31, at 953; Comment, supra note 31, at 601-04;
Comment, Freedom of Information Act: The Expansion of Exemption Six, 27 U. FLA.
L. Rav. 848 (1975); 16 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 240, 240-47 (1975).
54. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 9; HousE REPORT, supra note 34, at 11.
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though they also make it clear that this list is not meant to be exhaus-
tive.55 The House report suggests that files are similar when they
contain "intimate details" about individuals," while the Senate re-
port mentions records containing "vast amounts of personal data."57
The authors of the House report evidently contemplated a very broad
interpretation of "similar files" inasmuch as they concluded that
exemption 6 would exempt "those kinds of files the disclosure of
which might harm the individual.""
Under the ejusdem generis canon of statutory construction,5
however, the scope of "similar" would be restricted by the preceding,
more particular, reference to "medical" and "personnel" files. This
approach was taken by the Fourth Circuit in Robles v. EPA,"° where
the court stated that for a file to be "similar" it "must have the same
characteristics of confidentiality that ordinarily attach to informa-
tion in medical or personnel files; that is . . . 'intimate details' of a
'highly personal nature' . . . ."' The material sought in Robles was
an EPA survey of radiation levels of houses and buildings constructed
on a fill containing uranium tailings. 2 Since the information did not
relate to individuals or contain "intimate details," the court did not
believe that the threshold requirement for exemption 6 was met and
ordered the survey disclosed. 3
In marked contrast is the expansive interpretation of "similar
files" propounded by the Third Circuit in Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v.
IRS."4 In that case a distributor of amateur winemaking equipment
had sought from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms a list
of heads of households who had requested permission to make wine
55. "[Ihe committee decided upon a general exemption rather than a number
of specific statutory authorizations for various agencies." SENATE REPORT, supra note
2, at 9. Both reports preface their list of agencies with "Such agencies as." Id.; HousE
REPORT, supra note 34, at 11.
56. HoUSE REPORT, supra note 34, at 11.
57. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 9.
58. HousE REPoRT, supra note 34, at 11.
59. The rule of statutory construction that where general words follow
a designation of particular subjects or classes or persons, the meaning of the
general words will ordinarily be presumed to be restricted by the particular
designation, and to include only things or persons of the same kind, class or
nature as those specifically enumerated ....
BALLANTN's LAw DicTNoxY 393 (3d ed. 1969).
60. 484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973).
61. Id. at 845; see 16 B.C. INDus. & COM. L. REv. 240, 245-47 (1975).
62. See 484 F.2d at 844.
63. After the court stated that it did not believe the threshold requirement had
been met, it assumed arguendo that the survey results were "similar files" in order to
reach its alternate holding that disclosure would not result in an unwarranted invasion
of privacy. See id. at 846-48.
64. 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974).
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for family use."5 In determining whether these lists were similar to
medical or personnel files, the court rejected any interpretation of
"similar" that would "preclude inquiry into th[e] more crucial ques-
tion" of whether an unwarranted invasion of privacy might result
from disclosure."6 The court ruled that the list of names and addresses
sought by the company was a "similar file,""7 effectively holding that
whenever disclosure of a file would constitute an unwarranted inva-
sion of privacy, there is a "personal quality" to the information that
makes it similar to personnel or medical files. 6
This broad interpretation of "similar files" received support from
the Supreme Court in Department of the Air Force v. Rose."' In
holding that disciplinary case summaries of cadets at the Air Force
Academy were similar to personnel files," the Court stated that the
most significant attribute that characterized the file as similar to a
personnel file was that disclosure of the summaries "implicates simi-
lar privacy values."' The Court reasoned that since disclosure of the
summaries would cause the same type of embarrassment and harm
as would disclosure of medical or personnel files, they were similar
files. The Court's test for "similar files" therefore focused not on the
physical resemblance of the files, but rather on the effect of their
disclosure.72" Under this test, a file is a "similar file" whenever its
disclosure would result in an invasion of privacy comparable to that
which would result from disclosure of medical and personnel files.
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Rose, a federal district
court in Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB73 had looked to the
nature of the information contained in union authorization cards
rather than the effect of their disclosure in determining whether the
cards were "similar files." The court concluded that the data appear-
ing on the card-name, address, department, work shift, and state-
65. See id. at 134.
66. Id. at 135 ("We do not believe that the use of the term 'similar' was intended
to narrow the exemption from disclosure and permit the release of files which would
otherwise be exempt because of the resultant invasion of privacy.").
67. See id.
68. For criticism of this interpretation, see Comment, supra note 53; 16 B.C.
INDus. & COM. L. Rlv. 240 (1975).
69. 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
70. See id. at 376.
71. Id.
72. In reasoning that the summaries were similar to personnel files, the Court
adopted the lower court's view that "identification of disciplined cadets-a possible
consequence of even anonymous disclosure-could expose the formerly accused men
to lifelong embarrassment, perhaps disgrace, as well as practical disabilities, such as
loss of employment or friends." Id. at 377 (quoting Rose v. Department of Air Force,
495 F.2d 261, 267 (2d Cir. 1974)).
73. 414 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Pa. 1976), rev'd, 556 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1977).
[Vol. 62:949
PRIVACY EXEMPTIONS
ment of union support-were not intimate details of the sort found
in medical histories and personnel files, and that therefore the cards
were not similar files.7' In reversing this ruling, the Third Circuit
relied on Rose and its own expansive interpretation of "similar files"
in Wine Hobby to support its conclusion that a narrow or technical
reading of "similar" would defeat the purpose of exemption 6 by
preventing consideration of the crucial question of privacy. 5 As in
Wine Hobby, a conclusion that disclosure of the cards would consti-
tute an invasion of privacy served also to support the characterization
of the cards as "similar files."
7
By defining "similar" in terms of the effect of disclosure rather
than by the contents of the file, courts following Wine Hobby have
effectively rejected any threshold requirement for exemption 6.
Under this definition, "similar files" is rewritten to mean all files,
and the sole criterion for nondisclosure under exemption 6 is whether
disclosure would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy." The
74. See id. at 432. Even if the court had followed the Rose "effect of disclosure"
approach, however, it would have reached the same result, for, in considering the
applicability of exemption 7(C), the court held that disclosure of authorization cards
would not constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. See id. at 433.
75. See Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214, 219 (3d Cir.
1977).
76. Despite the court's emphasis on the result of disclosure in its definition of
"similar," the court went on to rule that the thumbnail sketch of an employee's name,
job classification, and shift found on the cards also made them analogous to personnel
files. See id. at 220. The Third Circuit's holding that authorization cards are exempt
from disclosure under exemption 6 has been followed in Pacific Molasses Co. v. NLRB,
577 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1978); Madeira Nursing Center v. NLRB, 96 L.R.R.M. 2411
(S.D. Ohio 1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-3370 (6th Cir. July 19, 1977); Howard
Johnson Co. v. NLRB (Region 3), 96 L.R.R.M. 2214 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); and L'eggs
Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 93 L.R.R.M. 2488 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
In applying the Wine Hobby standard to authorization cards, the court in Howard
Johnson relied heavily on an analogy to Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir.
1971), discussed at notes 175-78 infra and accompanying text, which had indicated
that lists of names and addresses of employees eligible to vote in union elections were
"similar files" under exemption 6. The Howard Johnson court reasoned that authori-
zation cards indicating an employee's private choice to support a union are at least as
confidential and worthy of protection from disclosure as were the employee lists consid-
ered in Getman. See 96 L.R.R.M. at 2216-17. The difficulty with the court's analogy,
however, is that Getman never actually held that these lists were similar files, but only
assumed that classification arguendo to reach its holding that disclosure of the lists
would not constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. See 450 F.2d at 674, 677.
Despite this misplaced reliance on Getman, it does seem that disclosure of an em-
ployee's statement of support for a union would result in as serious an invasion of
privacy as the disclosure of the home winemaking lists in Wine Hobby. See notes 136-
39 infra and accompanying text.
77. This point was expressly recognized in Judge Skelton's concurring and dis-
senting opinion in Pacific Molasses Co. v. NLRB, 577 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1978), a case
that followed the reasoning of Masonic Homes as to the applicability of exemption 6
to the disclosure of union authorization cards:
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problem with this approach is that the statute says "personnel and
medical files and similar files.""8 While a general safeguard in the
FOIA against all unwarranted invasions of privacy may be desirable,
Congress did not provide one. Although there is some suggestion that
Congress intended exemption 6 to serve as a general privacy protec-
tion clause,79 Congress made clear in the statute itself that the ex-
emptions do not "authorize withholding of information or limit the
availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated.""0
Whatever the merits of the Wine Hobby approach from a practical
standpoint, its reading of "similar files" as synonymous with all files
clearly strains the "specifically stated" requirement to the limit.
B. EXEMPTION 7: "INvESTIGATORY RECORDS COMPILED FOR
LAW ENFORCEMENT PURPOSES"
In contrast to the ambiguous legislative history concerning the
intended scope of exemption 6, Congress clearly expressed its intent
[The Pacific Molasses majority] hold[s] that the union cards are personal
to the workmen and that disclosure would invade their privacy and, there-
fore, the cards are similar to personnel files and should not be disclosed. This
result has been reached by reverse reasoning. . . . Under this holding any
invasion of personal privacy would result in non-disclosure regardless of
whether the material was a personnel, medical or similar file.
Id. at 1188.
It is interesting to note that this "reverse reasoning" was the interpretation of the
exemption given by the Attorney General in 1967: "It is apparent that the exemption
is intended to exclude from the disclosure requirements all personnel and medical files,
and all private or personal information contained in other files which, if disclosed to
the public, would amount to a clearly unwarranted invasion of the privacy of any
person.. . ..." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATroRNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE PUB-
LIC INFORMATION SECTION OF THE ADwMNIsTRArIvE PROCEDURE ACT 36 (1967) (emphasis
added).
78. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1976).
79. The Senate report refers to exemption 6 as a "general exemption," and with-
out mentioning the "similar files" clause, states, "It is believed that the scope of the
exemption is held within bounds by the use of the limitation of 'a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy.'" SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 9. The House report
states that the exemption is intended to exclude "those kinds of files the disclosure of
which might harm the individual." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 34, at 11. One commen-
tator has argued that
Congress did not say that such files were the only ones to be protected. The
general context of the discussion indicates that these descriptive phrases
[intimate details; highly personal nature] were used merely to illustrate the
reach of the exemption and not to define a threshold issue. In the absence
of a clearer indication that Congress actually wished to release some files
which would cause a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy, it is wiser to
follow Wine Hobby and deny much limiting effect to the definition of
"similar files."
Comment, supra note 31, at 603-04.
80. 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1976) (emphasis added).
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that exemption 7's "law enforcement purposes" be construed nar-
rowly in order to achieve full agency disclosure. Under the original
version of exemption 7,81 the Circuit Court for the District of Colum-
bia, in Center for National Policy Review on Race & Urban Issues v.
Weinberger,2 denied a request for disclosure of public school records
on segregation and discrimination practices that had been submitted
to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). The
court had characterized these records as being compiled for "law
enforcement purposes" even though it was highly unlikely that HEW
would ever use them in a proceeding to terminate federal funding.9
Thereafter, Congress amended exemption 7 because it thought that
National Center and several similar decisionsu had created so large
a loophole that the statute's goal of full disclosure would be de-
feated." The authors of the amendment specifically indicated that
the amendments were to override National Center.8
This amendment has clear implications for a suit to compel dis-
closure of union authorization cards. Like HEW compliance forms,
union authorization cards are collected as part of a regular agency
procedure, and there is only a slight possibility that they will ever be
81. Prior to its amendment in 1974, the exemption read, "investigatory files
compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent available to a private
party." Act of July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-847, 80 Stat. 250 (current version at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(7) (1976)). The amended version of exemption 7 appears at note 4 supra.
82. 502 F.2d 370 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
83. See id. at 373-74.
84. See, e.g., Ditlow v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1073 (D.C. Cir.) (letters between the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and automobile manufacturers con-
cerning possible safety defects held exempt under exemption 7), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
974 (1974); Weisberg v. Department of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en
banc) (spectographic analysis of the bullet that killed President Kennedy held exempt
from disclosure as part of a file compiled for law enforcement purposes, even though
the file and investigation were closed), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974).
85. See H.R. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974) (conference report).
See generally Note, The Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1974: An
Analysis, 26 SYRACUSE L. REv. 951 (1975); see also [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6267.
86. Mr. Kennedy .... Does the Senator's amendment in effect over-
ride the court decisions in ... Weisberg against United States; Aspin
against Department of Defense; Ditlow against Brinegar; and National Cen-
ter against Weinberger?
As I understand it, the holdings in those particular cases are of the
greatest concern to the Senator from Michigan. As I interpret it, the impact
and effect of his amendment would be to override those particular decisions.
Is that not correct?
Mr. Hart. The Senator from Michigan [sic] is correct. That is its pur-
pose. That was the purpose of Congress in 1966, we thought, when we en-
acted this.
120 CONG. Rc. S9336 (daily ed. May 30, 1974); accord, H.R. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 12 (1974) (conference report).
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used by the Board in an enforcement proceeding. Unless the cards
can somehow be distinguished from HEW compliance reports, it
would be difficult for a court to disregard the congressional intent
that such records are not within the ambit of exemption 7.
Apparently recognizing this fact, the Third Circuit narrowly in-
terpreted "law enforcement purposes" in Masonic Homes to refer
only to the prosecution of law violators in a pending formal proceed-
ing.87 Since the authorization cards in question were collected not to
prove an employer violation but merely to ascertain a showing of
interest in an election, the court ruled that the cards had not been
compiled for law enforcement purposes and thus were not exempted
from the FOIA full disclosure requirements by exemption 7.1 The
court distinguished another Third Circuit case, in which exemption
7 had been held applicable to witness affidavits,89 on the ground that
there the employer seeking disclosure was also involved in an unfair
labor practice proceeding." The court reasoned that only if the disclo-
sure request were made in conjunction with a formal proceeding could
an investigatory record be considered as compiled for "law enforce-
ment purposes"; otherwise, all Board records would be exempt from
disclosure, since all of its records are compiled for the enforcement
of the NLRA9
In Donn Products, Inc v. NLRB,92 an Ohio federal district court
rejected this distinction by holding that exemption 7 did not prevent
disclosure of authorization cards even though the request was made
by an employer involved in an unfair labor practice proceeding." The
court reasoned that the cards were collected prior to and independent
of any enforcement proceeding and did not become investigatory re-
cords compiled for law enforcement purposes simply because a com-
plaint was subsequently filed against one of the parties." The court
in Donn Products expressed the fear that a broader reading of exemp-
tion 7's threshold language would render immune from disclosure
every document in the Board's possession.9"
87. See 556 F.2d at 219.
88. See id. at 217-18.
89. Roger J. Au & Son, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1976).
90. See id. at 81-82. In Au & Son the employer was involved in an unfair labor
practice proceeding and had requested copies of all written statements of the charging
parties or potential witnesses. The court held that disclosure would "interfere with
enforcement proceedings" and that the documents were therefore exempted from dis-
closure under exemption 7(A). See id. at 83.
91. See 556 F.2d at 219.
92. 93 L.R.R.M. 2065 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
93. See id. at 2066.
94. See id.
95. See id.
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The holding in Donn Products that the original purpose for col-
lecting the cards determines whether they are investigatory records
compiled for law enforcement purposes seems preferable to the dic-
tum in Masonic Homes that authorization cards sought by employers
in the midst of an unfair labor practice proceeding are "clearly com-
piled for law enforcement purposes," while cards sought prior to a
representation hearing are not. The Donn Products analysis better
fits the language of exemption 7, as the exemption's threshold re-
quirement refers only to the purpose for compiling the records and not
to their ultimate use." Although union authorization cards may ulti-
mately be used in an enforcement proceeding if the employer refuses
to comply with an order to bargain, 7 the purpose for compiling au-
thorization cards is always either to substantiate an adequate show-
ing of interest in a union representation election or to demonstrate
the majority status of the union."
Other courts, however, have held that authorization cards are
compiled for law enforcement purposes under exemption 7. In
Howard Johnson Co. v. NLRB (Region 3)," for example, a federal
district court reasoned that Congress' rejection of National Center's
"possible law enforcement proceeding" rule' simply did not apply
in a labor law context.' The court noted that prior to the 1974
amendment of exemption 7, the Fourth Circuit in Wellman Indus-
tries, Inc. v. NLRB02 had ruled that affidavits gathered by a Board
agent prior to the filing of an unfair labor practice complaint but
requested after the filing of the complaint were exempt from disclo-
sure. In Wellman the court had held that, since the affidavits were
gatheied as part of a procedure followed to enforce the rights estab-
lished by the NLRA, they were compiled for law enforcement pur-
poses. 0 The Howard Johnson court reasoned that because WelIman
96. The exemption is for "[i]nvestigatory records compiled for law enforcement
purposes." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1976).
97. See, e.g., Donn Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 93 L.R.R.M. 2065, 2066 (N.D. Ohio
1976).
98. In situations where employers have committed pervasive unfair labor prac-
tices, the Board will sometimes, instead of holding an election, accept the cards as a
demonstration of the union's majority status and order the employer to bargain with
the union. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). Since Gissel, unions
have often tried to collect cards from a full majority of the employees in case a situation
such as that in Gissel arises.
99. 96 L.R.R.M. 2214 (W.D.N.Y. 1977).
100. See notes 81-86 supra and accompanying text.
101. See 96 L.R.R.M. at 2217.
102. 490 F.2d 427 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 834 (1974).
103. See id. at 430 ("[Tihe Board's purpose here was to protect and vindicate
rights set out in Section 7. Though procedures vary, if aimed at enforcement of the
NLRA we think they are for 'law enforcement purposes.' ").
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was not expressly mentioned by Congress as one of the cases over-
turned, it remained good law."'
Given the factual differences between the two cases, the reliance
on Wellman in Howard Johnson seems misplaced. Unlike Wellman,
the prospect of an actual unfair labor practice complaint against the
plaintiff-employer in Howard Johnson remained as speculative at the
time of the FOIA suit as when the cards were originally collected. The
mere fact that both Wellman and Howard Johnson are labor cases is
insufficient justification for ignoring the clearly expressed congres-
sional intent that records gathered for some indefinite future enforce-
ment proceeding are not exempt from disclosure under exemption
7.105
The Howard Johnson court did, however, suggest another ration-
ale for the conclusion that the cards meet the exemption 7 threshold
requirement. Rather than emphasizing the possibility of future law
enforcement proceedings, the court considered the card compilation
itself as part of a law enforcement proceeding. 11 This approach may
be justified, inasmuch as a dissection of the Board's law enforcement
procedures into precomplaint and postcomplaint periods does not
reflect the special nature and sequence of the labor relations proceed-
ings established by Congress. Federal court review of union certifica-
tion procedures prior to the election is forbidden '1 in order to ensure
that the process is free from the tensions and interferences that might
accompany a protracted election period."8 Only after an employer
refuses to bargain with a certified union and the Board files a com-
plaint are disputes about the validity of the election procedures fully
adjudicated. 09 The process leading to such a complaint begins with
104. See 96 L.R.R.M. at 2217. See generally Backdooring the NLRB, supra note
5, at 171, 176-78.
105. "[S]uch a reading of the amended Act fails to take into account the depth
of congressional concern with the expansive interpretation given the exemption by
certain courts." Backdooring the NLRB, supra note 5, at 178.
106. "To be 'for law enforcement purposes', the anticipated use of the investiga-
tory records does not require as their object adversary proceedings. Neutral investiga-
tory proceedings, such as the pre-election proceedings in this case, are included." 96
L.R.R.M. at 2217 (emphasis added).
107. Board decisions in certification proceedings, including decisions relating to
the employees' showing of interest, the eligibility of voters, the appropriate bargaining
unit, and the conduct of the election, are not final orders reviewable by the courts of
appeals under 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1970). See AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 407-09
(1940).
108. See generally notes 20-22 supra and accompanying text.
109. The Supreme Court has recognized that the pre-election representation
hearing at which the showing of interest is determined and the unfair labor practice
proceeding "are really one." See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146,
158 (1941). Because authorization cards are submitted as part of the investigation for
the representation hearing, the compilation of the cards is arguably part and parcel of
the investigation for an unfair labor practice proceeding.
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the collection of authorization cards, which are instruments in the
Board's pre-election investigation, and a hearing on the existence of
"a question of representation affecting commerce.""' If the card
collection process, forming as it does the necessary precondition for
any refusal-to-bargain complaint, is considered to be a law enforce-
ment proceeding, nondisclosure of authorization cards is arguably
consonant with the congressional intent behind the 1974 amendment
of exemption 7.
This approach parallels Donn Products, in that the court's char-
acterization of the purpose for compiling the cards does not depend
on the subsequent litigative status of the FOIA plaintiff, but rather
on the original reason for compilation of the cards. In Donn Products,
however, the court held that the original reason for card collection
was not law enforcement,"' and on the balance this would appear to
be the better view. The relative infrequency of refusal-to-bargain
suits in comparison to the routine gathering of cards demonstrates
the speculativeness of the prospect of litigation. Moreover, unlike the
HEW reports at issue in National Center, the authorization cards
have a purpose wholly apart from enforcement.112 They are primarily
intended as an administrative device for determining whether an
election is warranted. Thus, the distinctions between authorization
cards and HEW reports appear to cut both ways. The Howard
Johnson court's emphasis on the special procedures that govern
union elections and unfair labor practice litigation led it to stretch
the "law enforcement purposes" threshold to, and quite possibly be-
yond, the limit of Congress' clearly expressed intent.
C. SUMMARY
From the foregoing it appears that if the courts were to take
seriously the clearly expressed congressional intent that agency docu-
ments be disclosed unless specifically exempted and that the exemp-
tions themselves be narrowly construed, union authorization cards
would have to be disclosed, for they do not satisfy the threshold
requirement of either exemption 6 or 7. It cannot be denied, however,
that the general reluctance of courts to reach this conclusion is
grounded in some very real concerns, for disclosure of authorization
cards infringes not only statutory but also constitutional rights of
employees.
110. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1970).
111. See 93 L.R.R.M. at 2066.
112. In National Center, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
required that reports be submitted only "when there [was] reason to suspect that a
public school [was] practicing racial segregation." 502 F.2d at 372. Authorization
cards, on the other hand, are voluntarily submitted to the NLRB by unions without
any suspicion of wrongdoing on the part of the employer.
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I. DISCLOSURE OF AUTHORIZATION CARDS AS AN
UNWARRANTED INVASION OF PRIVACY
As a practical matter, the determination whether a record is a
"similar file" or a record "compiled for law enforcement purposes"
may ultimately depend'on whether a court feels that disclosure would
subject individuals to "unwarranted" invasions of privacy."' The use
of "unwarranted" in these two exemptions"' suggests that a court is
to balance the conflicting considerations, but there is a dispute in the
legislative history on this point. The Senate report indicates that the
exemptions require "a balancing of interests between the protection
of an individual's private affairs from unnecessary public scrutiny,
and the preservation of the public's right to governmental informa-
tion." ' 5 The House report, however, states that the exemptions them-
selves "provided a proper balance" of these interests.'5 Confronted
with this basic conflict in the legislative history, almost all courts
have found the Senate report the more reliable guide to congressional
intent since the House report was written after the Senate had
passed the bill. '17 Moreover, the House interpretation is difficult to
reconcile with the language of the exemption. The exemption does
not say serious or grave, but rather "unwarranted" invasions of pri-
113. See notes 64-77 supra and accompanying text.
114. The addition of "clearly" in exemption 6 ostensibly requires the government
to establish a stronger justification for nondisclosure under exemption 6 than under
exemption 7. The Supreme Court in Rose stated that the addition of "clearly" reflects
a "significant determination" since the drafting committees specifically rejected
agency requests to delete the word. Further, in drafting exemption 7(C), the Confer-
ence Committee deleted "clearly" at the request of President Ford. See Department
of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 378 n.16 (1976). "Clearly" also serves to remind
the courts that they should "tilt the balance in favor of disclosure." Getman v. NLRB,
450 F.2d 670, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1971). It has been observed, however, that "the difference
in a practical sense is probably more apparent than real." ACLU PROJEcr, supra note
5, at 70.
115. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 9. Although the report discusses exemption
6, its interpretation of "unwarranted invasion of privacy" presumably applies to both
exemptions.
116. HousE REPORT, supra note 34, at 11.
117. [Ihe House report ... should not be a guide to legislative
intent, because it was written after the Senate had passed the bill. The
courts have overwhelmingly adopted the ... idea that the House report is
relatively unreliable. See, e.g., Soucie v David, 448 F2d 1067, 1077, n39
(CADC 1971); Getman v NLRB, 450 F2d 670, 673, n8 (CADC 1971); Hawkes
v IRS, 467 F2d 787, 797 (CA6 1972): "To adopt the statutory interpretation
put forward in the House Report would be to allow a single house of the
Congress to effectively alter the meaning placed on proposed legislation by
the other house without altering a word of the text. We do not believe that
this represents a wise approach to statutory interpretation."
K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATm LAW OF mE SEvENrs § 3A.2, at 57-58 (1976).
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vacy. It therefore seems to require that courts weigh the factors that
warrant disclosure against the seriousness of the invasion of privacy
to determine if the invasion is "unwarranted."'1 s
This balancing test requires an analysis of both the privacy inter-
est and the public's right to governmental information."' To under-
stand the tests applied in the authorization card cases, it is necessary
to trace the analysis of these two competing interests in the judicial
interpretations of exemptions 6 and 7(C).
A. EVALUATING THE INVASION OF PRIVACY
The courts analyzing "invasion of personal privacy" under ex-
emptions 6 and 7 have generally focused on the embarrassment
caused by disclosure. 12 In Rural Housing Alliance v. United States
Department of Agriculture,"2' for example, an invasion of privacy was
defined as the "embarrassing" disclosure of "intimate details" such
as "marital status, legitimacy of children, identity of fathers of chil-
dren, medical condition, welfare payments, alcohol consumption,
family fights, and reputation." 12 The Supreme Court in Department
of the Air Force v. Rose, 121 citing Rural Housing, also emphasized the
"lifelong embarrassment, perhaps disgrace" that disclosure of disci-
plinary records might cause.' 2'
The Rural Housing standard of embarrassment, however, pro-
vides unreliable guidance in situations where the information dis-
closed is not itself particularly embarrassing but becomes so only
118. See Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133, 136 (3d Cir. 1974).
119. See generally Hulette, Privacy and the Freedom of Information Act, 27
AnpsN. L. REv. 275, 276-83 (1975); Tanner, The Judge, The Philosopher, and The
Personal Privacy Exemption of the FOIA: An Existential Search for Coherence, in
PRIVACY AND Pusuc DlscLosuREs UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION Acr 1 (D. Ander-
son & B. Janes eds. 1976); Michigan Project, supra note 30, at 1078-85; Note, supra
note 31, at 953-56; Note, Freedom of Information Act-The Parameters of the
Exemptions, 62 GEo. L.J. 177, 196-99 (1973); Note, Invasion of Privacy and the Free-
dom of Information Act: Getman v. NLRB, 40 GEO. WASH. L. Rzv. 527 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Invasion of Privacy]; Note, The Plain Meaning of the Freedom
of Information Act: NLRB v. Getman, 47 INn. L.J. 530 (1972); Note, Privacy, Public
Interest and Judicial Equitable Discretion Within the Freedom of Information Act, 6
U. TOL. L. Rxv. 215 (1974); Comment, supra note 31; Comment, supra note 53;?16 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 240 (1975).
120. Courts often assert that disclosure results in unwarranted invasion of pri-
vacy without explaining the basis of their conclusion. See, e.g., Ditlow v. Schultz, 517
F.2d 166, 170 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (customs declarations); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670,
675 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Excelsior lists); Sonderegger v. United States Dep't of Interior,
424 F. Supp. 847, 856 (D. Idaho 1976) (disaster payment claims).
121. 498 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
122. Id. at 77.
123. 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
124. Id. at 377.
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because of the nature of the list from which the information is taken.
In prior cases involving similar situations, the application of the em-
barrassment standard by the courts has not led to consistent results.
In Disabled Officer's Association v. Rumsfeld,125 for example, the
court held that disclosure of the names and addresses of persons
identified as being disabled and retired military officers was not an
invasion of privacy," 6 while in Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS'2 it was
held that disclosure of the names and addresses of persons identified
as being heads of households and home winemaking licensees did
constitute an invasion of privacy.'1
The embarrassment standard was used by the district court in
Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB 12 in ordering disclosure of
the union authorization cards. Finding no reason "why a person
should be embarrassed or harmed should it come to the employer's
or anyone else's attention that such person executed a union authori-
zation card,"'' the district court held that disclosure involved no
invasion of personal privacy.'
Even assuming that the embarrassment standard adequately il-
luminates the issue of personal privacy in an authorization card
case, '3 the district court in Masonic Homes misapplied the test in
two respects. First, as noted by the Third Circuit in its reversal, the
district court apparently based its finding of no embarrassment on
the erroneous assumption that the NLRA gives employers the right
to inspect authorization cards when recognition of a union is sought
without an election, solely on the basis of the cards.'1 Relying on this
faulty premise," 4 the district court reasoned that the employees
125. 428 F. Supp. 454 (D.D.C. 1977).
126. Id. at 459.
127. 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974).
128. Id. at 137.
129. 414 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Pa. 1976), rev'd, 556 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1977).
130. Id. at 432; accord, Pacific Molasses Co. v. NLRB, 95 L.R.R.M. 2638, 2641
(E.D. La. 1977) (authorization cards not exempt under exemption 6 since that exemp-
tion is limited to "intimate family relationships, personal health, religious and philo-
sophical beliefs and matters that would prove personally embarrassing to an individual
of normal sensibilities") (emphasis added), rev'd, 577 F.2d 1172.(1978).
131. 414 F. Supp. at 433.
132. The embarrassment standard has failed to produce consistent judicial re-
sults. See text accompanying notes 125-28 supra; notes 136-39 infra and accompanying
text. A preferable analysis of the privacy interest in the authorization card cases is one
based on the chilling effect of disclosure. See notes 140-71 infra and accompanying
text.
133. See 556 F.2d at 218 n.3.
134. The court in Howard Johnson Co. v. NLRB (Region 7), 444 F. Supp. 843
(W.D. Mich. 1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-1763 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 1977), also as-
sumed that the Board discloses authorization cards to employers when it issues a Gissel
order. In reversing the district court in Masonic Homes, the Third Circuit correctly
stated that "[a]t most, unions in that position might have offered to have a neutral
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signed the cards without any expectation of privacy. 3 5 The second
problem with the district court's holding is that it is inconsistent with
Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 3' one of the leading cases defining
invasion of privacy in terms of personal embarrassment. In Wine
Hobby, the embarrassment lay in being identified as the head of a
household and as a winemaker. 13 In Masonic Homes, the potential
embarrassment was far more serious-being identified as a supporter
of a union wishing to organize the employer's plant. 131 In Masonic
Homes, at least as much as in Wine Hobby, the information was of a
sort that "the individual may fervently wish to remain confidential
or only selectively released.' ' 3
In lieu of the embarrassment test, courts have focused on the
importance of authorization cards in the representation election pro-
cess."' One court has emphasized the NLRA mandate that an em-
ployee be able to make a private choice of bargaining representatives:
"The interest in confidentiality which attaches to a union authoriza-
tion card approaches that which surrounds the secret ballot in an
third party check the cards." 556 F.2d at 218 n.3 (citing NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,
395 U.S. 575, 587, 593 (1969)).
135. The district court stated that when a union sought recognition on the basis
of authorization cards alone, "[tihe employer would be entitled to examine the au-
thorization cards .... It is, therefore, unrealistic to claim that the disclosure of the
authorization cards to the employer would be an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy." 414 F. Supp. at 432.
136. 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974).
137. See id. at 136-37. The court found a threefold invasion of privacy: (1) unre-
stricted disclosure of a person's address, which may result in unsolicited and offensive
mail; (2) disclosure of personal home winemaking activity; and (3) disclosure of who
is the head of the household along with the fact that the person is not living alone (since
persons living alone need not register). Id. at 137.
138. Disclosure of authorization cards could cause loss of face with fellow em-
ployees and with the employer. Employer retaliation is also a realistic possibility;
employees continue to complain that employers use threats, coercion, and unfair dis-
charges to thwart union organization. See H.R. REP. No. 637, 95th Cong., 1st Sees. 8
(1977) (report of the Committee on Labor and Education on the proposed Labor Re-
form Act of 1977):
The extensive oversight hearings conducted by this committee occurring
over a period of more than 16 years have led to two central conclusions: The
Act today does not provide the "assurance" its sponsors intended to write
into law-that the exercise by employees of their right to organize "will not
result in discriminatory treatment or the loss of the opportunity to work
Of the 23,496 alleged unfair labor practice charges filed against employers during
the fiscal year ending June 30, 1976, 15,090 allegations included a charged violation of
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970). See 41 NLRB ANN. REP. 208 (1976).
139. 502 F.2d at 137.
140. See, e.g., NLRB v. Biophysics Sys., Inc., 91 L.R.R.M. 3079, 3081 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
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election.' Thus, the Third Circuit in Masonic Homes reasoned that
disclosure of the cards would "directly undercut" the policy behind
section 9 of the NLRA,"2 which requires an election by secret ballot."
3
While an authorization card is neither totally secret, in that the
signer's identity is revealed to the Board, nor a ballot, in that those
who sign the cards are free to vote against the union in the actual
election, an employee signing a card does not simply express an inter-
est in having an election held,"' but authorizes a specific union to be
his representative in collective bargaining with his employer, just as
he does on a ballot."' Because the secret ballot requirement is an
attempt to shield an employee from having to reveal his decision
concerning the designation of a bargaining representative, disclosure
of the cards would largely defeat the statutory design.
Courts have also analyzed invasion of privacy in terms of the
chilling effect that disclosure of the authorization cards would have
on employees' exercise of their statutory rights "to self-organization,
to form, join or assist labor organizations, [and] to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing.""' These courts
have recognized that real or imagined threats of retaliation by em-
ployers influence the outcome of union organizational campaigns," 7
and that many employees would be reluctant to sign cards during the
beginning stages of an election campaign if they thought their sup-
port of the union would be disclosed to their employers. Since
141. Id.
142. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1970).
143. 556 F.2d at 221.
144. See NLRB v. Peterson Bros., Inc., 342 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1965); Levi
Strauss & Co., 172 N.L.R.B. 732, 733 (1968).
145. See 2 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BoAID, CASEHANDLING MANUAL § 11028
(1975).
146. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). See Pacific Molasses Co. v. NLRB, 577 F.2d 1172,
1182 (5th Cir. 1978); Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214, 221 (3d
Cir. 1977); Howard Johnson Co. v. NLRB (Region 3), 96 L.R.R.M. 2214, 2218
(W.D.N.Y. 1977); NLRB v. Biophysics Sys., Inc., 91 L.R.R.M. 3079, 3081 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
147. See Pacific Molasses Co. v. NLRB, 577 F.2d 1172, 1182 (5th Cir. 1978)
("We would be naive to disregard the abuse which could potentially occur if employers
and other employees were armed with this information."); Committee on Masonic
Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214, 221 (3d Cir. 1977) ("We need only consider whether
employees would be as likely to sign a prominently displayed notice at work, 'Sign up
for the union here. Organize for better working conditions and higher wages.' "); How-
ard Johnson Co. v. NLRB (Region 3), 96 L.R.R.M. 2214, 2218 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) ("The
real or imagined threat of retaliation by an employer. . . may have a 'chilling effect'
upon an employee taking part in any representation petition."); NLRB v. Biophysics
Sys., Inc., 91 L.R.R.M. 3079, 3081 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("The NLRB's recognition of
[the delicate relationship between the employer and employee] explains its reluct-
ance to release information which might tend to strain that relationship and unduly
hamper the Board's efforts to enforce federal labor legislation.").
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"[s]olicitation of authorization cards plays a vital role in organiza-
tional campaigns,"'' government disclosures of the cards would chill
employees in the exercise of "their protected rights to seek a represen-
tation election."'
4
In its attempt to limit this chill on statutory rights and to main-
tain the laboratory conditions essential to the conduct of free elec-
tions,"' the Board has adopted procedures that guarantee the confi-
dentiality of the employee's choice to support a union."' Under this
analysis a privacy interest attaches to the cards not only as part of
the secret ballot requirement of the NLRA,"2 but also because it is
essential to the policy of free employee choice that an employee be
permitted to keep his union sympathies confidential.
In addition to chilling significant statutory rights, however, dis-
closure of union authorization cards may also infringe upon the exer-
cise of first amendment rights. The first amendment protects the
right of persons to come together freely and organize a union.' Since
148. Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214, 221 (3d Cir. 1977).
149. NLRB v. Biophysics Sys., Inc., 91 L.R.R.M. 3079, 3081 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). A
concrete example of how employee activity might be chilled is provided in an appeal
brief filed by the Board. See Brief for Appellee, Madeira Nursing Center, Inc. v.
NLRB, No. 77-3370 (6th Cir., filed July 19, 1977). After a pre-election hearing, but
prior to the hearing examiner's decision as to whether an election should be held, an
employer enclosed a letter in the employees' pay envelopes advising them that it had
sued the Board under the FOIA to allow the employer to inspect and authenticate the
union authorization cards. The employer expressed its belief that "we will win this suit
as other U.S. District Courts have allowed employers to inspect these cards. We want
to dispel the myth that a majority of our people want representation by a union." See
id. at app. 7. The letter then informed employees that they could get their card back
by writing a letter to the Board. See id.
150. See General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948); text accompanying notes
14-25 supra. The recent limitation on the laboratory conditions doctrine in Shopping
Kart Food Mkt., 94 L.R.R.M. 1705 (N.L.R.B. 1977), does not constitute a complete
rejection of the concept. While the Board announced in that case that it will no longer
probe the truth or falsity of campaign statements, Chairman Murphy made clear that
she would "continue to set aside an election in the event of misconduct involving
threats, promises of benefit, or similar improprieties." Id. at 1708.
151. The Board and courts have attempted to prevent involuntary disclosure of
employees' attitudes toward unionization by prohibiting employer surveillance of
union activities, see Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 840, 851 (1966), by disallow-
ing employer interrogation of employees regarding their signing authorization cards of
other support for a union, see NLRB v. Cement Transp., Inc., 490 F.2d 1024, 1028 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 828 (1974), and by placing strict limitations on employer
polling of employees, see Struksness Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062, 1064 (1967).
152. See text accompanying notes 144-45 supra.
153. "[The First Amendment's guarantees of free speech, petition and assem-
bly give. . . workers the right to gather together for the lawful purpose of helping and
advising one another in asserting the rights Congress gave them. . . ." Brotherhood
of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 5 (1964); see UMW,
District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Connecticut State Fed'n of
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solicitation of the cards is essential to the effective organization of a
union,15 any governmental action that would chill card solicitation
may infringe upon the employees' rights of free association.
In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson," the Supreme Court
explicitly recognized "the vital relationship between the freedom to
associate and privacy in one's associations. . . .Inviolability of pri-
vacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensa-
ble to preservation of freedom of association . . . ."I" The Court
further noted that compelling "disclosure of affiliation with groups
engaged in advocacy may constitute [an] effective . . . restraint on
freedom of association . . . 7
While a formal distinction can easily be drawn between
Patterson, in which a state court ordered an organization to disclose
to the state government information about its members, " and the
authorization card cases, in which the government would merely
disclose the personal information voluntarily submitted to it,'9 the
distinction is unpersuasive. In Patterson the Court did not locate
the chilling effect in the government's action per se, but rather found
it in the exposure to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of
physical coercion, and other manifestations of community hostility,
Teachers v. Board of Educ., 538 F.2d 471, 478 (2d Cir. 1976); Hanover Fed'n of Teach-
ers Local 1954 v. Hanover Community School Corp., 457 F.2d 456, 460 (7th Cir. 1972);
American Fed'n of State, County, & Mun. Employees v. Woodward, 406 F.2d 137, 139
(8th Cir. 1969); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287, 289 (7th Cir. 1968); University
of N. H. Chapter of the Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Haselton, 397 F. Supp. 107,
108-09 (D.N.H. 1975).
154. See Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214, 221 (3d Cir.
1977).
155. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
156. Id. at 462.
157. Id.
158. See also Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1962); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109
(1959).
159. This distinction is usually cast in terms of rights of autonomy versus rights
of disclosure or informational privacy:
Individual autonomy refers to the right to determine for oneself whether one
will go through or abstain from certain experience, such as contraception or
abortion. On the other hand, informational privacy is, as so well defined by
Professor Alan F. Westin, "[the] claim of individuals . . . to determine for
themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is com-
municated to others."
Leigh, Informational Privacy: Constitutional Challenges to the Collection and Dissem-
ination of Personal Information by Government Agencies, 3 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 229,
236 (1976) (footnotes omitted) (quoting A. WEsTiN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967)); see
Beardsley, Privacy: Autonomy and Selective Disclosure, in PRIVACY 56 (J. Pennock &
J. Chapman eds. 1971); Michigan Project, supra note 30, at 1292.
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which may dissuade persons from joining or induce them to withdraw
from the organization:"'
It is not sufficient to answer ... that [the] repressive effect
follows not from state action but from private community pres-
sures. The crucial factor is the interplay of governmental and pri-
vate action, for it is only after the initial exertion of state power
represented by the production order that private action takes hold.'
Although courts have not yet decided whether a right of informa-
tional privacy attaches to information voluntarily submitted to the
government,' the rationale of Patterson should apply since both
forms of disclosure inevitably restrain citizens from freely exercising
their first amendment rights.16 3
Furthermore, since the Board requires petitioners seeking the
benefit of a Board election to file authorization cards sufficent to
establish a showing of interest,' the protection of petitioners' right
to solicit the required cards is necessary for the preservation of their
right to petition the government, as protected by the first amend-
ment. "'65 Because the right to petition is regarded as " 'among the
most precious of liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights. . . laws
which actually affect the exercise of these vital rights' need not do so
directly or overtly to be adjudged constitutionally offensive."' 66 Thus,
in Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc.,"7 the Seventh Circuit found
a federal statute, under which an Internal Revenue Service official
privately brought suit against persons who had complained about his
performance, constitutionally offensive because "the prospect of a
federal lawsuit resulting from any citizen complaint about the con-
duct of federal officials could chill the exercise of the right to peti-
160. See 357 U.S. at 462-63.
161. Id. at 463.
162. See Leigh, supra note 159, at 235 ("In its privacy decisions the Court has
confined itself to the discussion of the right of individual autonomy, and has not yet
addressed the right of informational privacy.").
163. For discussion of the right of informational or disclosural privacy and its
various constitutional bases, see Leigh, supra note 159; Michigan Project, supra note
30, at 1277-97.
164. See notes 16-19 supra and accompanying text.
165. "Petitioners ... have the right of access to the agencies and courts to be
heard on applications .... That right ... is part of the right of petition protected
by the First Amendment." California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404
U.S. 508, 513 (1972); see Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State
Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1964). See also Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco
Local Joint Executive Bd., 542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940
(1977).
166. Stem v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1342-43 (7th Cir.)
(quoting UMW, District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967)), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 975 (1977).
167. 547 F.2d 1329 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 975 (1977).
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tion."' In Stern, as in the authorization card cases, the court was
not faced with a prohibition of petitioning activity, but with a federal
statute that private individuals could use to harass citizens to pre-
vent them from freely exercising their right to petition. The constitu-
tionally offensive situation led the Stern court to construe the statute
so as to deny the plaintiff a cause of action."9 The same result should
be reached where government disclosure of authorization cards could
restrain employees from freely associating in a group and from mak-
ing use of the Board procedures to advocate their views.
Since the statute can be interpreted to avoid disclosure, and
because, as a matter of principle, courts will avoid the constitutional
question in a case whenever possible, it is not necessary for courts to
deny disclosure on constitutional grounds. 10 Still it is useful for
courts to apply this constitutional analysis in determining whether
there exists a right of privacy that could be invaded by disclosure. By
defining the right in terms of first amendment values, disclosure
would be warranted only where a compelling state interest is shown.'
B. THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW
Once a court determines that an invasion of privacy exists, it
must decide whether the invasion is "unwarranted." As indicated in
the Senate Judiciary Committee's report on the FOIA, such an inva-
sion is warranted if it is necessary to preserve the public's right to
governmental information.7 This right is ultimately based upon the
necessity of an informed electorate in a democratic society.7 3 Thus,
in general terms, the standard for determining the public's need for
168. Id. at 1343.
169. See id. at 1344.
170. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932). If the courts attempt to decide
the authorization cases on constitutional grounds, they will have to decide whether the
government is the proper party to assert the employees' right of first amendment
privacy against the alleged improper state action. In NAACP v. Alabama ex reL
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), the Court allowed the Association to assert the consti-
tutional rights of its members: "To require that it be claimed by the members them-
selves would result in nullification of the right at the very moment of its assertion."
Id. at 459. The Court has been sympathetic to this problem and has allowed a doctor
to assert the rights of his patients, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1963),
and a white homeowner who was a party to a racially restrictive property covenant to
bring suit on behalf of potential black purchasers, see Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S.
249 (1953). It is not clear, however, that this principle should be extended to allow the
very governmental agency that will commit the improper state action of disclosure to
be the representative of the party whose privacy will be invaded.
171. See Connecticut State Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 538 F.2d 471,
478 (2d Cir. 1976).
172. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 9.
173. See id. at 3.
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specific records under the FOIA is based on the degree to which the
requested information is necessary for the maintenance of an in-
formed electorate."' A workable approach to evaluating the public's
need to know has, however, proven elusive. The difficulties lie in
identifying the public's interest in disclosure and in delineating
where that interest overlaps with, and where it is distinct from, the
interest of the individual litigant.
In Getman v. NLRB, 175 one of the first cases to construe exemp-
tion 6, two labor law professors conducting a study of union voting
patterns sought disclosure of Excelsior lists-lists of the names and
addresses of employees eligible to vote in upcoming union elections. 7,
In defining the public interest in disclosure, the court felt compelled
by the "clearly unwarranted" language of exemption 6 to disregard
the FOIA requirement that disclosure be made to "any person" and
thus considered the special qualifications of the requesting plaintiffs.
The court noted that the plaintiffs were highly qualified researchers,
that the public could benefit from their empirical study of election
influences, and that the study was approved by experts around the
country and funded by the National Science Foundation.177 As a cor-
ollary to this plaintiff-oriented evaluation of the public interest, the
court concluded that the invasion was warranted if the information,
once disclosed, was used "only by the requesting party and for the
public interest purpose upon which the balancing was based."1 8
By focusing on the plaintiff's grounds for seeking disclosure, the
Getman approach allows a court to estimate not only the public
interest to be served by the plaintiff's proposed use of the informa-
tion, but also the seriousness of the invasion of privacy that disclosure
entails. Under this approach, disclosure of private information de-
pends on the extent to which it will serve a public purpose under the
particular circumstances.179
174. See id. See generally Comment, supra note 31, at 606-10.
175. 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
176. Employers must provide the Board and union(s) with a list of the names
and addresses of all employees eligible to vote in a representation election once it has
been determined that an election must be held among the employers' work force. See
Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966). These lists are commonly known
as Excelsior lists.
177. See 450 F.2d at 674-77. The court also pointed out that the particular
research model drawn up and tested by the plaintiffs did not appear to bias the
interviewed employees. See id. at 676.
178. Id. at 677 n.24.
179. See generally Note, The Privacy Act of 1974: An Overview and Critique,
1976 WAsH. U.L.Q. 667, 704-05. As noted by the court in Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v.
IRS, 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974), there is an argument that the plaintiff-oriented
approach in Getman is within the language of the FOIA since the "any person" require-
ment of section 552(a)(3) "applies only to matters not within any of the exemptions
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This approach's must be evaluated, however, in the light of two
important factors. First, the FOIA does not authorize judicial super-
vision of the use of disclosed information. If limited disclosure were
allowed, each person needing information would have to bring a sepa-
rate FOIA suit, the exact purpose for disclosure would have to be
presented to the court, and there would have to be a policing mecha-
nism to ensure that information was used as authorized in the disclo-
sure order. That Congress did not outline such a scheme of disclosure
indicates that such was not its intent.
Second, the Getman policy of limited disclosure stands in direct
contradiction to the language and legislative history of the FOIA.
Congress stated that nothing in the FOIA authorized limiting the
availability of information to the public if it was not specifically
exempted.'"' Access by the general public to all information was thus
a conscious policy choice by Congress.' 2 Moreover, in amending the
information disclosure provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act'1 by enactment of the FOIA,'8 ' Congress expressly eliminated the
requirement that a person seeking information be "properly and di-
rectly concerned"'' 5 and instead provided for disclosure "to any per-
son."'' 6 It does not seem likely that after rejecting a plaintiff-oriented
standard of disclosure, Congress intended to implicitly reinstate this
approach by the use of "clearly unwarranted."
Taking a view sharply opposed to that of Getman, the Fourth
Circuit in Robles v. EPA'7 rejected any balancing of interests under
the "clearly unwarranted" clause.' The court restricted its inquiry
enumerated in § 552(b). Thus it is only the non-exempt material that must be made
available to 'any person.'" Id. at 136.
180. For criticism of the Getman decision, see Michigan Project, supra note 30,
at 1081-83; Invasion of Privacy, supra note 119; Comment, supra note 31, at 611-18.
181. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1976).
182. The FOIA "eliminates the test of who shall have the right to different
information . . . .[A]ll citizens have a right to know." SENATE RE'oRT, supra note
2, at 5-6.
183. Act of July 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238 (current version at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552 (1976)).
184. Act of July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §
552 (1976)).
185. As the Senate Judiciary Committee noted, one of the serious deficiencies
in the Administrative Procedure Act prior to the enactmert of the FOLA was that
section 3(c) limited the availability of public records "to persons properly and directly
concerned . . . ." SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5.
186. 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1976).
187. 484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973).
188. See id. at 847-48. The court's analysis was confused in that it took the EPA's
argument "that disclosure should be refused because it 'would do more harm than
good,'" id. at 847, and collapsed it into the balancing approach suggested by the
"clearly unwarranted" language of exemption 6. While the court recognized, and re-
jected, the EPA's argument as a basis for denying disclosure solely on equitable
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to whether there was a serious invasion of privacy, stating that "the
right to disclosure under the Act is not to be resolved by a balancing
of equities or a weighing of need or even benefit.""'
The Supreme Court accepted neither of these approaches in
Department of the Air Force v. Rose. 110 Instead, the Court enunciated
the basic principle that exemption 6 requires "a balancing of the
individual's right of privacy against the preservation of the basic
purpose of the Freedom of Information Act, 'to open agency action
to the light of public scrutiny.' "1" Under such a test, the public
interest is not coextensive with the special needs, interests, or in-
tended uses of the plaintiff in an FOIA suit, but rather is evaluated
in terms of the interest of the informed electorate in disclosure.
19 2
Only to the extent that general disclosure reveals the workings of
government to the public does it serve the public interest. But since
the Court never actually reached the question whether the invasion
of privacy was clearly unwarranted, "3 it left the lower courts with the
difficult task of applying its test of public interest.
In Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB,'I the Third Circuit
acknowledged the Rose definition of public interest and found that
disclosure of union authorization cards alone would reveal little about
the operations of the National Labor Relations Board."9 5 This analysis
of the public interest, however, is too limited. While the public inter-
est is not coextensive with the plaintiffs litigative interest in the
cards,' it is certainly in the public interest to have citizens well
informed in their dealings with administrative agencies.'97 Similarly,
there is a "broader public interest in correct adjudication of adminis-
grounds, see id., it apparently did not consider that such an argument could also be
applied to a completely distinct analysis based on the statutory exemption as sug-
gested by Getman. Compare id. at 847-48, with Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 674-
78 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
189. 484 F.2d at 848.
190. 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
191. Id. at 372.
192. See Comment, supra note 31, at 607-10.
193. See 425 U.S. at 380-81.
194. 556 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1977).
195. See id. at 220. The court also rejected plaintiff's argument that the public
would save tax monies by not having to pay the expenses of the Board in conducting
an election. The court reasoned that card challenge proceedings were likely to cost
taxpayers as much as a representation hearing. See id.
196. "[A litigant's] rights are neither increased nor decreased by reason of the
fact that it claims an interest in the [documents sought] greater than that shared by
the average member of the public." NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143
n.10 (1975); see EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79, 92 (1973).
197. The FOIA attempts "to afford the private citizen the essential information
to enable him to deal effectively and knowledgeably with the Federal agencies."
SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 7.
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trative proceedings [and] in whether public servants carry out their
duties in an efficient and law abiding manner." ' 8
In Howard Johnson Co. v. NLRB (Region 3),111 the court did
consider disclosure of the authorization cards to be in the public
interest to the extent it ensured the Board's efficient and proper use
of its resources in connection with representation elections. ' The
court observed, however, that the importance of informed litigants
and correct administrative decisionmaking in this type of case is
mitigated by the nature of the Board's proceedings. Collective bar-
gaining is not forced upon an employer simply because a thirty per-
cent showing of interest has been made. Generally, a secret ballot
election stands between the employer and any government-enforced
bargaining. 0 ' Although the representation election itself might con-
stitute an unfair and inefficient Board action if an improper authenti-
cation of cards was made, disclosure of the cards would do little to
improve upon the existing procedures for determining whether there
is an adequate showing of interest.0 2 An employer can already request
the Board to compare signatures on the authorization cards with
employees' payroll signatures and submit to the Board any informa-
tion he has concerning card irregularities or fraud."' The opportunity
to examine the signed cards himself would not significantly increase
the employer's ability to ensure proper agency action. Thus, even
under a broad interpretation of public interest that recognizes the
importance of fairness and efficiency in administrative proceedings,
the benefit derived from disclosing authorization cards is minimal.
Since the public need for disclosure of authorization cards is not
compelling under any view,0 ' results under the courts' balancing of
198. Columbia Packing Co. v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 417 F. Supp.
651, 655 (D. Mass. 1976).
199. 96 L.R.R.M. 2214 (W.D.N.Y. 1977).
200. Id. at 2218; accord, Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 414 F. Supp.
426, 433 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (disclosure of the cards might result in the Board making a
more informed decision about whether to hold an election or in the employer agreeing
to bargain without an election), rev'd, 556 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1977).
201. See Howard Johnson Co. v. NLRB (Region 3), 96 L.R.R.M. 2214, 2218
(W.D.N.Y. 1977). When an employer has engaged in unfair labor practices, however,
he may be ordered to bargain without an election solely upon a showing of majority
interest as evidenced by signed authorization cards. See NLRB v. Gissel, 395 U.S. 575
(1969).
202. " '[flt is the election . . .which decides the substantive issue whether or
not the [union] or another labor organization, if any, actually represents a majority
of the employees involved in a representation case.'" NLRB v. J.I. Case Co., 201 F.2d
597, 600 (9th Cir. 1953) (quoting O.D. Jennings & Co., 68 N.L.R.B. 516, 518 (1946)).
203. See Howard Johnson Co. v. NLRB (Region 3), 96 L.R.R.M. 2214, 2218
(W.D.N.Y. 1977).
204. Even ihe district court in Masonic Homes did not claim that the benefits
noted in the opinion were very important. It said only that they "must not be over-
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interests have been largely determined by the initial finding on the
invasion of privacy issue. Thus, where the courts believed that statu-
tory privacy interests might be violated by disclosure, the invasion
was held to be unwarranted.2 15 On the other hand, where the court
believed that disclosure would not be embarrassing, the modicum
of public interest in card disclosure was sufficient to warrant the
invasion of privacy.0 '
C. SUMMARY
The critical factor in the authorization card decisions has been
the willingness of the courts to examine the role of the cards in light
of current procedures designed to effectuate the organizational rights
of employees under the NLRA.17 Since the privacy of the choice
reflected in the signing of the cards is essential to the labor law policy
of promoting free representation elections, 28 most courts have recog-
nized that the NLRA and Board procedures have created a privacy
interest that is worthy of protection under the FOIA.
Courts adopting this approach have found that disclosure would
produce a chilling effect on employees' rights to unionize and have
therefore held that disclosure would constitute an unwarranted inva-
sion of privacy. Following the lead of Wine Hobby and Rose, courts
in Masonic Homes and Howard Johnson held that whenever a disclo-
sure of an agency record would constitute an unwarranted invasion
of privacy, the record is "similar" to a personnel or medical file.200
Similarly, the court in Howard Johnson was also willing to interpret
the "law enforcement purposes" of exemption 7 broadly in order to
avoid card disclosure."' The result, then, of emphasizing the labor
law context of a request for union authorization cards is a rejection
of any threshold requirement for exemption 6 by expanding "similar
files" to mean all files, and a liberal interpretation of "law enforce-
ment purposes" in the face of the clearly expressed congressional
looked." 414 F. Supp. at 433.
205. See Pacific Molasses Co. v. NLRB, 577 F.2d 1172, 1182 (1978); Committee
on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214, 221 (3d Cir. 1977); Howard Johnson Co.
v. NLRB (Region 3), 96 L.R.R.M. 2214, 2218 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); NLRB v. Biophysics
Sys., Inc., 91 L.R.R.M. 3079, 3081 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
206. See Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 414 F. Supp. 426, 433 (E.D.
Pa. 1976), reo'd, 556 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1977).
207. "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
208. See notes 140-52 supra and accompanying text.
209. Accord, Pacific Molasses Co. v. NLRB, 577 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1978). See
generally notes 64-77 supra and accompanying text.
210. See notes 99-110 supra and accompanying text.
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intent that this phrase be narrowly construed. On the other hand,
those courts that have not emphasized the labor law aspects of the
suits have held that card disclosure would not constitute an unwar-
ranted invasion of privacy.11
IV. CONCLUSION
On the whole, the better view would be to protect authorization
cards from disclosure. Disclosure would surely run counter to congres-
sional intent embodied in the NLRA by frustrating well established
procedures for the determination of bargaining representatives. More
important, given the lack of any compelling state interest to justify
disclosure and its concomitant chill on the employees' exercise of
their rights of free association and petition, disclosure potentially
constitutes an interference with first amendment rights.
In construing the FOIA so as to permit nondisclosure, exemption
6 provides a slightly preferred basis over exemption 7. A broad read-
ing of exemption 6's threshold requirement that union authorization
cards be "similar" to personnel files is consonant with prior judicial
interpretation of exemption 6, including the Supreme Court's con-
struction in Rose.2 1 2 On the other hand, although exemption 7's
"investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes" lan-
guage would seem more applicable to the cards if the unique sequence
of NLRA investigation and litigation is taken into consideration, the
application of exemption 7 has been expressly narrowed by Congress
to exclude materials routinely gathered without connection to any
specific adjudicatory proceeding.213 In addition, the authorization
cards are not clearly distinguishable from the records that the Senate
sponsors of the 1974 amendments intended to exclude from the pro-
tection of exemption 7, and are, if anything, even less directly related
to law enforcement proceedings than were the HEW reports at issue
in National Center.2 14
Broad construction of the exemptions in order to avoid chilling
employees' statutory and constitutional rights raises serious prob-
lems of FOIA interpretation, however. First, a broad interpretation
of exemption 6 and 7 threshold requirements runs counter to the
general policy that FOIA exemptions be construed narrowly. More-
211. See Donn Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 93 L.R.R.M. 2065, 2066 (N.D. Ohio 1976)
(authorization cards are not investigatory records compiled for law enforcement pur-
poses); Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 414 F. Supp. 426, 432 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
(authorization cards are not similar files), rev'd, 556 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1977).
212. See notes 64-72 supra and accompanying text. But see notes 77-79 supra and
accompanying text.
213. See notes 84-86 supra and accompanying text.
214. See text accompanying notes 81-83 supra.
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over, a broad reading of the threshold requirements may in the future
allow the exemptions to be extended by analogy to less appropriate
situations."5 Such a reading also sets a precedent for broad construc-
tion of other exemptions, a result that would frustrate the statutory
goal of fullest possible disclosure."'
Further, a broad interpretation creates practical problems when
the FOIA is read in conjunction with the Privacy Act of 1974.17 Under
the Privacy Act, a person may sue the government and collect dam-
ages, court costs, and attorneys' fees if an agency releases personal
information without the individual's consent,"' unless disclosure is
required under the FOIA.1 9 Since only costs and attorneys' fees are
awarded in a successful FOIA disclosure suit,2 0 it would normally be
cheaper for the government to defend and lose a FOIA suit than a
Privacy Act suit. It is therefore possible that agencies may choose
to refuse requests for disclosure made under the FOIA, rather than
disclose the information and risk Privacy Act suits alleging that the
information was exempted from disclosure by one of the nine FOIA
exemptions.? 1 Given the past record of agencies' attempts to avoid
215. See generally Backdooring the NLRB, supra note 5, at 183 ("Deference to
the labor posture of a case without reflection upon its FOIA implications may result
in an evasion of congressional intent. Moreover, many courts have not restricted the
precedential value of their holdings to the labor context.").
216. Congress has already expressed its displeasure with the gradual judicial
extension of the limits of exemptions 3 and 7. In response to the broad judicial interpre-
tations of the exemptions, Congress amended both exemptions, setting forth more
exactly the grounds for withholding information. Exemption 7 was amended in re-
sponse to the decision in Center for Nat'l Policy Review on Race & Urban Issues v.
Weinberger, 502 F.2d 370 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See notes 81-86 supra and accompanying
text. Amendment of exemption 3 was prompted by the decision in Administrator, FAA
v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255 (1975), which held reports on commercial airplane mainte-
nance exempt from disclosure because the Administrator determined under the Fed-
eral Aviation Act § 1104, 49 U.S.C. § 1504 (1976), that disclosure might adversely affect
the subjects of the records, and thus it was not in the public interest. Congress made
clear that it did not intend such general statutory provisions to justify nondisclosure
by changing part of the language of exemption 3 from "specifically exempted from
disclosure by statute," Act of July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (current
version at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976)), to "specifically exempted from disclosure by
statute . . . , provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld
from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) estab-
lishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be
withheld . . . ." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976). See generally Halperin, Exemption
(b)(3), in ACLU PRojEcr, supra note 5, at 25.
217. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976); see Comment, supra note 31, at 624-31, 628.
218. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4) (1976).
219. See id. § 552a(b)(2).
220. See id. § 552(a)(4)(E).
221. See Comment, supra note 31, at 627-28.
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disclosure of records," the result of the Privacy Act may be a general
reluctance to disclose voluntarily any record that the agencies could
possibly contend fits into an expansive reading of exemptions 6 and
7.211 Ironically, it was just this problem of broad discretionary
loopholes under the Administrative Procedure Act that originally
prompted Congress to enact the FOIA with its specific exemptions
and goal of full agency disclosure.2
At a minimum, the broad interpretation of the exemptions in the
authorization card cases should not establish controlling precedent
for subsequent construction of the FOIA exemptions in other con-
texts. Because the possible unconstitutionality of card disclosure dic-
tates a liberal reading of the FOIA, 2 5 the broad interpretation of
exemptions 6 and 7 found in the authorization card cases is probably
appropriate in that context, but should not be applied in any case in
which a constitutional question has not been raised.
Where constitutional and significant statutory rights are jeop-
ardized by disclosure, as is the case with union authorization cards,
disclosure is probably inappropriate. But such an outcome is not
without its costs. Courts continue to be burdened with a large number
of FOIA suits challenging the Board's refusal to disclose not only
authorization cards, but also witness affidavits and Board agents'
reports.2 1 Perhaps more serious, however, is the danger that broad
interpretation of the FOIA exemptions, made necessary by the threat
disclosure poses, will undermine the entire structure of that Act and
largely defeat the laudable congressional goal that underlies it. These
problems should not be left to judicial construction or agency good
faith. Congress itself must provide more concrete guidance.
There are two possibilities. First, the FOIA could be amended to
provide a general exception for all matter, the disclosure of which
would cause an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Indeed,
222. See generally, Nader, Freedom from Information: The Act and the
Agencies, 5 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1970).
223. Under a broad interpretation of "similar files," almost any record that
contains personal information may be exempt from disclosure under exemption 6.
Likewise, under a broad interpretation of "law enforcement purposes," many routine
agency records only marginally connected with law enforcement may become exempt
from disclosure under exemption 7.
224. The Senate report notes that under the Administrative Procedure Act, "any
Government official can . . . withhold almost anything from any citizen under the
vague standards ... in section 3." The FOIA, it stated, "sets up workable standards
.... In particular, it avoids the use of such vague phrases as 'good cause found' and
replaces them with specific and limited types of information that may be withheld."
SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5.
225. See notes 153-69 supra and accompanying text.
226. See Connolly & Fox, supra note 5, at 230-37; Backdooring the NLRB, supra
note 5.
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this is already the direction taken in judicial construction of exemp-
tion 6. Such a provision is unlikely for several years, however, if at
all, until the practical difficulties of the recently enacted Privacy Act
of 19742 and Government in the Sunshine Act'2 are revealed. More
important, however, such a broad exemption would, as Congress
must have recognized when it chose to limit privacy protection to two
specific contexts, pose a serious threat to the goal of full disclosure.
The concept of privacy is too amorphous to provide reliable guidance.
The second and better alternative is the more specific one. Con-
gress should review NLRB procedures to determine exactly what in-
formation should not be disclosed and then amend the NLRA accord-
ingly.2 1 Once the NLRA is so amended, exemption 3 of the FOIA
would then clearly apply to prohibit disclosure of union authorization
cards. 20 Such an amendment would decrease the strain on the
Board's legal staff and on court dockets.2 3 More important, the
amendment would allow courts to prevent disclosure of union author-
ization cards without having to adopt a broad construction of the
227. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976).
228. Id. § 552b.
229. Since the rights of employees threatened by disclosure of union authoriza-
tion cards are so significant and the loss of information valuable to an informed electo-
rate so slight, it appears that authorization cards should never be disclosed. The
outcome of this balancing with respect to witness affidavits, however, is more proble-
matic. In determining disclosure rules for these documents, Congress should balance
the need for more modem discovery procedures in Board proceedings against the
possible frustration of the Board's ability to enforce the NLRA against the invasion of
employees' privacy and the consequent chill of their statutory and constitutional rights
to associate freely and to petition the government.
230. Exemption 3 applies to records "specifically exempted from disclosure by
statute." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976). The text of exemption 3 appears at note 4 supra.
Even if Congress does not specifically amend the NLRA to exclude disclosure of
authorization cards and other documents, it can be argued that the cards are exempt
under exemption 3. The Board requires that balloting in a representation election be
secret, see 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1970), and authorization cards are like ballots in that
they reveal an employee's designation of a particular union to represent him in collec-
tive bargaining with his employer, see text accompanying notes 24-25 supra. Further-
more, in situations where an employer guilty of unfair labor practices is ordered to
bargain solely on the basis of a majority showing of authorization cards, see NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), the cards are the functional equivalent of
ballots. Nondisclosure of the cards can be said to be dictated by the NLRA, therefore,
because disclosure would reveal the very information that the statute seeks to keep
confidential and because the cards sometimes take the place of ballots. The problem
with this argument is that the cards are not completely identical to ballots, and
amended exemption 3 has been construed very narrowly. See Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Hosp. Auth. v. Perry, 571 F.2d 195, 198-201 (4th Cir. 1978). There is no reason, how-
ever, to read exemption 3 narrowly while broadly construing exemptions 6 and 7.
231. Over 75 FOIA suits seeking disclosure of authorization cards, witness affida-
vits, agent reports, and other Board documents have been filed against the Board in
the past few years. See ACLU PRoJECr, supra note 5.
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threshold requirements of exemptions 6 and 7. Ultimately, it would
serve to reinforce the right of citizen access to governmental informa-
tion by removing a major impediment to a balanced interpretation
of the FOIA exemptions.
